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Background and Context 
Targeting, the process of directing subsidised 
inputs to particular areas and to households 
within those areas, plays a critical role in the 
FISP. It involves the implementation of 
particular targeting systems which are 
intended to deliver particular targeting 
outcomes, the patterns of subsidised input 
access across areas and households. These 
affect how inputs are used and hence 
programme impacts.  Targeting is controversial 
and political, as it determines whether or not, 
how and how much particular people and 
groups benefit from the programme. Targeting 
is also difficult – and the large scale of the 
programme across the country adds to the 
challenges and costs in implementing and 
supervising targeting.   
This policy brief sets out targeting issues 
that emerge from FISP evaluations and 
suggests criteria and options for improving 
targeting processes, outcomes and impacts.   
Targeting objectives and 
impacts 
Targeting objectives are determined by 
technical and political programme objectives 
and understanding of how subsidised inputs 
are used in different contexts and of how this 
affects input productivity and its economic and 
social impacts. Programme objectives are to 
increase household and national production 
and food security but may also extend to 
include food self-sufficiency; beneficiary 
households’ asset building and graduation; 
improved welfare of vulnerable groups; and 
wider, inclusive social and economic growth. 
Major targeting impacts are affected by four 
key issues which determine the FISP’s 
effectiveness in achieving different objectives.  
Displacement is the process where 
households’ access to subsidised inputs causes 
them to reduce their purchases of unsubsidised 
inputs so that the incremental input use from 
the subsidy is less than the amount of subsidised 
inputs received. Displacement rates are affected by 
beneficiary characteristics, input and output prices, 
and market access. Analysis of household survey 
data gives estimates of 22%, 3%and 15% in 
2006/7, 2008/9 and 2010/11. All estimates agree 
that there is less displacement with poorer 
households. This suggests that to reduce 
displacement targeting should be aimed at poorer 
households.   
Productivity (incremental production per unit of 
incremental input used) is affected by beneficiaries’ 
farming skills and knowledge, crop management, 
application of complementary inputs (such as seed 
or organic or inorganic fertiliser) and timely 
planting and weeding. It is also affected by overall 
rates of input application per hectare and its spread 
(allowing for both subsidised and unsubsidised 
inputs), by application timing and methods, by soils 
and by rainfall. This suggests that targeting should 
focus on areas with higher productivity potential 
(as regards rainfall and soils). It is not clear what 
households should be targeted to get higher 
productivity – more wealthy households may be 
able to use subsidised inputs more efficiently as a 
result of their better use, but there may be trade-
offs between displacement and productivity gains.  
Economy wide effects of the subsidy programme 
are mainly from falling maize prices and higher 
wages with increasing labour and land productivity, 
leading to wider economic growth. Since higher 
wages and lower maize prices are particularly 
beneficial to the poor, promotion of these economy 
wide benefits is aligned with pro-poor growth 
objectives. These benefits are affected by targeting 
through its productivity and displacement effects 
and by the distribution of income benefits between 
different types of households in different areas: this 
affects market and growth linkage and multiplier 
effects, which are likely to be higher where poorer 
households are the main beneficiaries.  
The implications for targeting are that inputs 
should be focussed on households yielding the 
greatest incremental production benefits (with 
possible trade-offs between higher input 
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productivity and displacement if less poor 
households use inputs more productively). 
Although this corresponds with maximising 
productivity impacts, concerns for wage and 
linkage impacts strengthen arguments for 
more targeting of poorer households and 
poorer areas.  
Graduation occurs when poor, vulnerable 
households and areas benefit from subsidised 
inputs with improved assets and livelihood 
opportunities allowing withdrawal of subsidies 
without reversion to their former poor, 
vulnerable state. It is helpful to distinguish 
between graduation by individual beneficiary 
households and graduation by the rural 
economy of specific areas.  
The potential for individual beneficiary 
households to graduate is affected by their 
characteristics, the number of years and size of 
subsidy received each year, weather, prices, 
growth in the wider economy, and working 
capital accumulation and/or livelihood 
diversification. Similarly the potential for 
particular areas to graduate is affected by their 
characteristics, the number and nature of 
beneficiary households, the scale of the subsidy 
per household, and changes in the wider 
environment (prices, weather, political change, 
etc). These interact with displacement, 
productivity and economy wide impacts.  
If graduation is being sought, then 
targeting should try to bring households 
and/or areas over ‘thresholds’ above which 
they can support sustainable adequate 
livelihoods and growth. This raises a difficult 
set of questions:  
• Is it better to focus limited resources on 
more households or areas for whom 
graduation is easier or on fewer poorer 
households or areas for whom graduation is 
more difficult? 
• What are the graduation thresholds for 
different households and areas? 
• How are households and/or areas for whom 
graduation is more or less difficult to be 
identified? 
It is clear that even if programme objectives 
have a relatively simple focus on national food 
self-sufficiency, targeting has to address 
difficult trade-offs between higher 
displacement and possibly higher incremental 
input productivity among less poor 
beneficiaries. There are greater and more 
complex trade-offs if wider pro-poor growth 
and graduation objectives are also important, 
requiring more attention to welfare gains, 
growth linkages and complex graduation processes 
among poorer beneficiaries.  Determination of ideal 
targeting outcomes is also made more difficult by 
other factors: 
• Objectives may be unclear, contested, highly 
variable and changeable.  
• We have limited information about differences in 
displacement, input productivity and labour 
market effects between subsidies provided to 
different households and areas, and about the 
relative effectiveness of different graduation 
strategies.  
The effectiveness of subsidies in meeting different 
objectives for and through different households and 
areas is also affected by a range of other policies 
and by macro-economic and other conditions. 
Targeting processes and systems 
FISP targeting processes can be considered in terms 
of six main stages (figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 Stages in the targeting system 
Setting of targeting criteria
Area & beneficiary identification
Coupon allocation
Coupon redistribution 
Coupon redemption
Coupon distribution 
 
There have been a number of changes in 
beneficiary and area targeting criteria over the life 
of the programme. Beneficiary targeting criteria 
have shifted from an initial focus on ‘full time 
smallholder farmers unable to afford purchase of 1 
or 2 unsubsidized fertiliser bags’ to put more 
emphasis on poor and vulnerable groups. There are, 
however, difficulties in applying these criteria due 
to ambiguities and tensions among different 
targeting criteria, difficulties in establishing 
measures for these criteria, large numbers of 
deserving households, and lack of understanding 
and other interests among those conducting 
beneficiary targeting. Area targeting has also shifted 
from allocation coupons in proportion to maize and 
tobacco crop areas to allocation in proportion to 
farm households. 
Allocations to different areas have also been 
affected by differential rates of growth in registered 
farm families in different areas, with, for example, 
very rapid increases in MoAIWD farm family 
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registrations in the central region from 2005/6 
to 2009/10.  
Coupon allocation, distribution and 
redistribution were initially conducted 
simultaneously within areas.  From 2008/9 a 
three step process was introduced, with farm 
family registration first, then coupon allocation 
to beneficiaries in an open meeting, and, also in 
open meetings, separate distribution of 
coupons to beneficiaries. A further 
redistribution in open meetings is widely 
reported, though not part of the official system. 
Use of open meetings is generally welcomed by 
rural people, but does not necessarily mean 
that they actively take part in targeting: it may 
be a forum where previously decided lists of 
beneficiaries are announced. A key factor in 
open meetings’ perceived success appears to 
be whether coverage has increased or 
decreased since the previous year. Separation 
of registration from distribution is seen as 
helpful as it allows time for people to find out 
where they stand regarding input allocations. 
Roles of different stakeholders (Traditional 
Authorities, VDCs, agricultural extension staff 
and police) in coupon allocation, distribution 
and redistribution have varied between years 
and regions. Considerable differences are 
reported between coupon allocation and 
receipt, as a result of (a) changes in allocation 
before distribution and (b) redistribution of 
coupons after initial distribution.  
Overall, despite significant the introduction 
of significant changes to improve beneficiary 
targeting criteria and processes, there are 
continuing fundamental difficulties with the 
lack of clarity in targeting criteria, the large 
numbers of households satisfying the criteria, 
and inconsistent application of criteria by local 
leaders and government staff. These difficulties 
continue to limit the achievement of desired 
beneficiary targeting outcomes. 
Targeting outcomes 
Changes in area allocation criteria have led to 
changes in coupon distribution between 
regions, with increases in coupons redeemed in 
the southern region reducing regional 
differences in redemptions per household 
(figure 2). 
It appears that districts with higher potential 
(roughly categorised by altitude) were 
generally allocated proportionally more 
coupons than low potential areas in 2010/11, 
but differentiation fell between 2006/7 and 
2010/11.  This    normally    involved     reduced  
Figure 2 Estimated mean fertiliser voucher redemption per 
household by region by year 
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allocations across the board in those districts with 
lower allocations, not the complete exclusion of 
significant areas. There is no evidence of greater 
proportionate allocation to districts with more poor 
households, although this increased substantially 
from 2006/7 to 2010/11 due to the shift in relative 
coupon allocations to districts with larger numbers 
of poor people in the south.  
This should have led to increased subsidy access 
by poor people and in turn reduced displacement, 
increased incremental production, and increased 
maize and labour market effects, benefiting poor 
non-beneficiaries as well as poor beneficiaries. 
These should (other things being equal) improve 
programme effectiveness and efficiency in 
promoting national and household food production, 
self-sufficiency, food security, social protection and 
poverty reduction (for both beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries). These effects may, however, be 
undermined if incremental production per unit 
input is lower for new beneficiaries in the south as 
compared with previous beneficiaries in the centre 
and north and if targeting of the poor is less 
effective in the south.  
Despite changes in beneficiary and area 
targeting criteria and processes, household survey 
data suggest that beneficiary targeting outcomes 
did not change much from 2006/7 to 2010/11: 
characteristics associated with less poor 
households tend to be correlated with greater 
likelihood of receiving subsidy coupons and (among 
those receiving coupons)  of receiving more 
coupons.  Reported distribution of coupons in open 
meetings did appear to increase the probability of 
poorer households receiving subsidised inputs in 
2008/9, but there is little other evidence that the 
proportion of relatively poorer households 
receiving the subsidy increased. Rural people’s 
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perceptions of targeting outcomes also do not 
suggest strong targeting to benefit poorer or 
more vulnerable households, nor any increases 
in such targeting.  There is also evidence of a 
steady increase in the proportion of 
households with only one coupon as a result of 
redistribution, although this is largely the 
result of increases in the numbers of 
households receiving coupons in the south, 
where this practice is most common.  Such 
households show a persistent pattern of 
poverty, with land, other asset holdings and 
subjective welfare indicators suggesting they 
are nearly as poor or sometimes poorer than 
households not receiving any coupons. This 
suggests that redistribution occurs with poorer 
beneficiaries sharing one of their coupons with 
poorer households without any coupons. 
Targeting options 
We now consider three possible alternative 
targeting approaches. We consider first a 
universal but smaller per household subsidy 
providing 50kg of fertiliser to all households 
(termed the ‘universal programme’), second 
‘tighter pro-poor targeting’ where the same 
total volume of subsidised fertiliser is targeted 
with a 100kg ration to the poorest households, 
and third ‘pro-poor mixed targeting’ where the 
same proportion of households get 100kg and 
50kg fertiliser as in 2010/11, but these are 
better targeted with the poorest households 
getting 100kg, less poor households getting 
50kg, and the least poor getting none.   
Universal provision of 50kg fertiliser is 
effectively legitimising and extending the 
widespread practice of redistribution. It has a 
number of advantages: 
• Elimination of targeting costs and 
difficulties  
• Increased transparency and accountability, 
as all households know their entitlement 
• high correspondence between planned 
targeting outcomes and those achieved 
• Increased effectiveness in targeting the poor 
as compared with 2010/11, as all the poor 
would receive some subsidised inputs.  
• Despite some increase in the number of less 
poor households receiving fertilisers, the 
total quantity of fertiliser going to less poor 
households would be similar to 2010/11 as 
they would receive only one bag per 
household. This may be seen as offering 
compensation for lower prices for less poor 
farmers’ surplus maize.  
• Reduced demands on coupon allocation and 
distribution processes may allow earlier coupon 
distribution, greater farmer confidence in 
subsidy receipt, and release time for more 
extension support to farmers. 
There are, however, also difficulties with this 
approach.  
• It may appear to be a reversion to the former 
‘starter pack’ approach, although there are 
substantial differences with the larger scale of 
the subsidised ‘pack’ and in its objectives.  
• There are concerns that incremental production 
from a smaller ration of subsidised inputs for 
each household may not provide poor 
households with enough productivity gains to 
‘lift’ them over productivity and asset thresholds 
needed for graduation.  
• Graduation could only be achieved if the whole 
programme were withdrawn from all 
beneficiaries in an area at the same time. 
Progressive beneficiary graduation and targeting 
would undermine the core benefits of universal 
targeting. However graduation might be pursued 
by progressive lowering of the subsidy with 
increasing beneficiary redemption payments.   
Tight pro-poor targeting of 100kg fertiliser is 
broadly the approach currently supposed to be 
used. If implemented effectively this would provide 
the lowest displacement and the highest pro-poor 
growth potential. There are, however, serious 
difficulties in applying this method, and targeting 
outcomes do not match aspirations. Improving the 
implementation of this approach must address 
current difficulties in both setting and applying 
measurable targeting criteria.   
Mixed pro-poor targeting of 50 and 100kg 
fertiliser is closest to the approach that is currently 
actually used, where there is redistribution of 
subsidy coupons. However, whereas in the current 
system most redistribution seems to involve 
sharing by poor recipients with poor non-
recipients, a more pro-poor approach would 
prioritise poorer recipients keeping their 100kg 
fertiliser allocation, while less poor recipients 
would get 50kg each, and the least poor would get 
nothing. While this lacks the strong transparency 
and accountability of the universal approach, it may 
provide better targeting and have wider community 
support than the tight pro-poor approach. It may 
consequently be more easily implemented – but it 
will still run up against the interests of powerful 
people who may be excluded from subsidy benefits, 
and will still face challenges in setting and applying 
criteria to identify target households. It might also 
allow a natural beneficiary graduation system with 
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households being shifted from a 100kg to 50kg 
to zero fertiliser allocation.  
All systems face major practical challenges 
in determining the number of eligible farm 
families in each area while both pro-poor 
approaches must also address the difficulty of 
identifying who is poor and not poor. Attention 
is also needed to processes of coupon 
redemption, as these can be highly 
exclusionary to poorer and more vulnerable 
people. Options include distribution centre 
committees, more private sector involvement 
in subsidised input sales (to promote 
competition), more effective market 
monitoring and auditing, and better integration 
with cash transfers for the productive poor 
who cannot afford redemption payments.  
Options for identifying beneficiaries  
The development of methods for better 
identification of targeted beneficiaries is a key 
requirement for improving targeting, unless it 
is accepted that difficulties with this (together 
with power, politics and problems of lack of 
accountability and transparency) make the 
universal approach the best practical approach.  
Two main approaches may be considered: 
proxy wealth/income measures, and 
community targeting. Both these methods  
1. require formal identification of targeting 
criteria and systems that when 
implemented provide improvements that 
justify their costs 
2. pay insufficient attention to difficulties 
associated with the large number of 
households clustered around the poverty 
cut-off point, and hence local concerns 
about ‘fairness’. 
3. need to overcome interests of less poor 
groups,  with enforcement of more 
transparent and accountable allocation and 
distribution processes –with open and 
inclusive processes and/or published 
recipients lists and allocation criteria. 
There is potential merit in the use of proxy 
poverty indicators, for example, but also major 
costs and challenges in gathering and using 
reliable data. Nevertheless, it may be useful to 
consider and develop alternative ways of 
implementing this (for example, criteria might 
be developed by a process of participatory 
consultations with rural people, and a small 
number of low cost indicators combined into a 
points system for household prioritisation in 
subsidy allocation).   
Community targeting with open meetings is the 
approach supposed to be used for identifying FISP 
beneficiaries. There is widespread concern that 
traditional leaders, government officials and others 
are appropriating coupons and/or directing them to 
themselves and/or friends and relatives. This 
perception is promoted by lack of transparency in 
allocation, misunderstanding of coupon allocations 
and targeting processes, and widespread belief that 
there should be more coupons. It may be difficult 
for targeting to be perceived to be fair if less than 
around 80% of households are targeted, and 
community targeting needs fairly costly training 
and facilitation with checks and balances to stop 
elite capture. 
Conclusions and Lessons 
The main conclusion from this paper is that despite 
substantial changes and improvements in targeting 
systems over the life of the programme, there are 
continuing major difficulties in implementing these 
systems and in improving targeting outcomes and 
impacts.  Major issues concern identification of 
desired targeting outcomes for maximising 
achievement of programme impacts, and working 
out and implementing effective targeting systems. 
Key issues to be considered in this are the relative 
importance of productivity, welfare, growth and 
graduation objectives, and potential impacts of 
different area and beneficiary targeting outcomes 
on these.  
Targeting needs to be considered in terms of 
both area and beneficiary targeting. Differences in 
potential productivity impacts, in welfare gains, and 
in contributions to wider growth are critical to the 
setting of targeting objectives. These then have to 
take account of likely achievement of these 
objectives with different targeting systems and 
methods – involving the setting of targeting criteria, 
establishment of area and household eligibility 
against these, and consequent allocation and 
distribution of inputs, taking account of budget and 
input supply constraints.  Alternative targeting 
systems need to be appraised against these issues.  
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